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ABSTRACT
In Pawn: Kurdish Economic Development in the context of conflict
Stephen E. McAvene III

In this paper the author examines the struggle of the Kurdish people for selfdetermined social, political, and economic development in the whirlwind of conflict in the
Middle East. It uses a case study of how a Kurdish minority in Iraq interact with multiple
stakeholders in their struggle for nationhood, and implications of these interactions for
overall Kurdish social and economic development. Studies on economic development
while interested in social, economic and political aspect of development, are less
concerned with the implications of right to self-determination on development; the unique
case of the Kurdish struggle provides an opportunity to expand the development discourse
surrounding self-determination for minority groups.
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Introduction
In the game of chess, the pawn is the weakest piece, leading the attack and often
sacrificed for strategic gain. However, if the pawn reaches the eighth final rank of the
board, it is promoted, exchanging its pawn status for that of a Queen, a sovereign piece. So
too is Kurdistan in pawn on the international stage, used by Western powers to promote a
Western political agenda in Iraq. As a pawn, they have led many attacks and sacrificed
much, but have grown in strength and stature, however the issue of their promotion to full
sovereignty remains unresolved.
This paper is an analysis of struggle for right to self-determination of Kurds who
are distributed within four countries in the Middle East. It focuses on the period during and
after the first Gulf war to the present. The case study focuses on the interaction and
relationship between the struggle for self-determination and social and economic
development of marginalized ethnic minorities focusing on the Kurdish minority in Iraq
and how they interact with multiple stakeholders in their struggle for nationhood, as well
as the implications of these interactions for Kurdish social and economic development.
Do the Kurdish people have a right to sovereignty? As we will see their cultural ties
to the area are unquestionable. However, even though self-determination is an
internationally recognized right, secession is often only recognized after the fact of
political power is established and economic development is catalyzed. To lend weight to a
claim of sovereignty via secession, the social contract with their internationally recognized
sovereign government must be shown to be unfulfilled. As we will also see, this is
arguably the case in Kurdistan. (Studies on economic development while interested in
1

social, economic and political aspect of development, are less concerned with the
implications of right to self-determination on development—this is the main contribution
of this study for development)
In the first section, I will present the current literature covering the intersection of
development and self-determination, focusing on the right to self-determination, its
modern origins, and its place in the economic, social, and political spheres of developing
areas. Section II will give a brief background on the Kurds, showing their unique status as
a marginalized people who have created their own space on the periphery of the
international community, and now approaching the cusp of possible inclusion. Section III
will examine the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, discussing its sustainable conception via conflict,
after the first Gulf war; the social, political, economic successes and developmental
promise Kurdistan has shown; as well as the challenges that have beset Kurdistan along the
way. Both successes and challenges are tied to Kurdistan’s economic development, and
Section IV will conclude this study, reviewing the effects of the intersection of economic
development and self-determination in Kurdistan, and the evidence regarding its future
status as an autonomous region or a fully sovereign nation.

2

Self-Determination
The idea of self-determination has been addressed in United Nations documents
since the inception of that organization. In the founding document, the UN Charter of
1945,Section Two of Article One explicitly places self-determination as essential to the
four Purposes of the United Nations.1 Self-determination was later established as a basic
right by the UN in 1966 via the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.2 Hans Morten Haugen
unpacked the nuances of these treaties and the United Nations de jure stance on selfdetermination in the Law Environment and Development (LEAD) Journal, the Right to
Self Determination and Natural Resources: The Case of the Western Sahara. This case
parallels Kurdistan in that a local ethnic group, the Sahrawi, has claimed independence and
sovereignty over the nation, while its neighbor, Morocco, lays territorial claim to the
nation. Haugen argues that the UN treaties and charters clearly support the Sahrawi claim
to the resources and the land, but external political and economic considerations with the
European Union and Morocco have prevented this interpretation. The inability of the local
people to control their natural resources limits their ability to develop economically.
Furthermore, the dispute over this control creates conflict that creates a need for direct
humanitarian aid, rather than development aid.
Developmental aid to non-sovereign regions is discussed at length by David
Williams in the Review of International Studies. His article, Aid and Sovereignty: Quasi1

http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html
Hans Morten Haugen ‘The Right to Self-Determination and Natural Resources: The Case of Western
Sahara’, 3/1 Law, Environment and Development Journal (2007), p. 70. http://www.leadjournal.org/content/07070.pdf
2
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States and the International Financial Institutions, focuses on the relationships between the
World Bank, the IMF, and quasi states, those states that enjoy a limited autonomy, yet not
sovereignty. He makes the point that in modern times the norm of sovereignty has become
intertwined with material well-being and economic development.3 In fact, “The most
significant norm which has become associated with the possession of sovereign statehood
is the pursuit of economic development”4 Along this line, he notes that increasingly IFIs,
International Financial Institutions, are endeavoring to provide aid and loans to nonsovereign regions. This creates a complicated situation when determining who is
responsible for servicing said loans, maintaining regional development goals, and insuring
that the funding is spent as it was intended. Those relationships and the agency granted to
the parties involved can be detrimental to development.
At the core of self-determination is democracy, the very notion requires a political
expression of governance from the people. Additionally, levels of democracy in a region,
as measured by IFIs and the UN, are factors in providing loans and establishing agency in
the international community. How democracy is interwoven with self-determination is
addressed by James Bohman in the February 2016 issue of Critical Horizons, in his article,
From Self-Legislation to Self-Determination: Democracy and the New Circumstances of
Global Politics. He asserts, “… democracy must serve to delegate power to complex units
of decision making which favour self-determination. Contestability is part of this form of
self-determination, allowing forms of politics to emerge based on the democratic rights and
3

David Williams Aid and Sovereignty: Quasi-States and the International Financial Institutions
Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Oct., 2000), p. 564 Cambridge University Press
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097699 Accessed: 08-03-2017 22:36 UTC
4
Ibid.
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powers of self-determining, non-dominated citizens.”5 This explicitly avers the right to
self-determination, and links it directly to democracy and democratic function, and the
agency they convey.
Does this right to self-determination imply the right of a group to secede from an
established nation? Arguably one follows the other, however Zoilo Velasco in the
international community law review disagrees that self-determination leads to secession.
“In reality, whether a certain group or "nation" can secede from an existing state is not a
function of self-determination. It is rather dictated by effective power or authority in
international politics, which assigns validity and approbation to secession.”6 This is surely
true in many examples of marginalized groups that seek their own place at the world table
via their own sovereign territory. It is also true in many examples, that those same people
do not have the political and economic power to do so. The international community may
acknowledge the right to self-determination but that does not translate to support for
secessionist movements. Even in cases such as the previously mentioned Western Sahara,
where the UN supports the de jure right of self-determination of the Sahrawi, the de facto
situation is that the Sahrawi are prevented from exercising that right because of the
political and military power of the other stakeholder, Morocco. This is realpolitik; to
exercise the right to self-determination beyond the narrative of a group, a group must have
the power to realize it a priori.

5

James Bohman From Self-Legislation to Self-Determination: Democracy and the New Circumstances of
Global Politics critical horizons, Vol. 17 No. 1, February, 2016, 123–134
6
Zoilo A.Velasco . “Self-determination and Secession: Human Rights-based Conflict Resolution”
International Community Law Review (2014) 75-105. Brill Hijhoff.
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Velasco attempts to separate secession from self-determination asserting the
sovereignty of states and their borders, particularly in nations where their other rights are
being protected and the social contract with the recognized government is being upheld.
He correctly traces the roots of the current international order back to the Post World War I
divisions of the Ottoman Empire and Germany, as well as the decolonization movements
post World War II.
The allowance of self-determination for former colonies and occupied areas has
faded over the years, especially in the context of development. Economic development via
globalization and neoliberal economics focuses on economic development, ostensibly
increasing the agency and power of the developed through economic means, as opposed to
direct political means. An acceptance of the current international status quo has become
part of the paradigm. A consensus on national borders is central to the disassociation of
secession and self-determination, however, historically this has been subject to the
previous realpolitik axiom of a priori political power, as epitomized by the formation of
Turkey in 1923 following the Treaty of Sevres after World War I, and the rise of the nation
of Israel after World War II, in 1948. Both groups asserted political power over geographic
areas that were historically theirs and were recognized by the international community as
sovereign nations. In both instances, violent tactics were determining factor, showing the
disparity and desperation of unfulfilled self-determination.

6

Who are the Kurds?

The Kurdish people have existed, as a group, for millennia. Their cultural existence
was documented as early as the 3rd century BCE by Alexander the Great, and are still a
vibrant and burgeoning culture today in the 21st Century. After spending most of the 20th
century struggling against oppression and marginalization, their over 2000 years of
enduring identity encompassing 18 million people is predominantly spread out between the
nations of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, a people divided by socially constructed borders
drawn by the West following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, Post-World War I.
These foreign imposed borders reflected Western political interests rather than the desires
of the inhabitants of the former Ottoman Empire, and the region has been in a state of flux
since. Denied the right to self-determination and their lands split between four nations, the
years that have followed have been punctuated by oppression through government led
sociocultural homogenization programs of Turkification in Turkey and Arabization in Iraq
intended to extinguish their culture and diminish their political power. These programs,
intended to marginalize the Kurdish people and their culture, have been met with
determined resistance and resilience.
Despite the whirlwind of violence that has encompassed the region since the United
States led first Gulf War in 1991 set the stage for the eventual downfall of the Hussein
regime in Iraq in the second Gulf War 2003, a nascent Kurdish state, Kurdistan, is growing
in the northeast of Iraq. Currently an autonomous region of Iraq it is comprised of three
governates, Erbil, Slemani, and Duhok. The area is rich with natural gas and oil fields, as
7

well as arable land, and the Zagros mountains which contain fertile valleys for farming.
These mountains have long been the only true friend of the Kurds, provided shelter and
sustenance in the face of oppression, and now they are providing a firm base for a possible
Kurdish nation. The dream of Kurdistan, that previously only existed in the Kurdish
paradigm, is edging closer to reality.7
The first Gulf War brought Western aid and Western protection for Kurdistan,
catalyzing growth fueled not only by dollars but by the drive of a culture long denied the
right to determine their own direction. This opportunity has been fraught with violence and
political strife internally, externally in relation to the rest of Iraq and other regional
interests, as well as on the larger international level with NGOs, nations, and international
corporations. Internally this strife was manifested during the early formation of Kurdistan
in the form of civil conflict. The Kurdish people have been a demographic minority in
Turkey, Iran, Syria, as well as Iraq; the possible rise of a Kurdish nation in Iraq would as a
beacon for Kurdish sovereignty across borders and could contribute to ongoing conflicts
involving Kurds in all three other nations. This makes a fully sovereign Kurdistan
unpalatable for those nations, but an autonomous Kurdistan valuable economically for its
abundance of oil and gas resources. Additionally, a semi-autonomous Kurdistan would
also have political value to rival nations, as a thorn in the side of the Iraqi government in

7

The term, no friend but the mountains, is a Kurdish colloquialism, and was used in the title of a Sundance
documentary film entry in 2000, Good Kurds, Bad Kurds: No Friend but the Mountains directed by Kevin
McKiernan. He delves into the symbolism of mountains in Kurdish culture as well as their significance in the
complex Kurdish struggle for self-determination from in Turkey and along the Iraqi border.
Kevin McKiernan. Good Kurds, Bad Kurds: No Friend but the Mountains, Directed by Kevin McKeirnan,
(2000; Access Productions), VHS.
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Baghdad that is struggling to maintain a fragile control over a nation that has been beset by
civil conflict and insurgencies since the second Gulf War in 2003.
As Shia and Sunni elements of Iraq have vied for power in Iraq, Kurdistan’s,
United Nations backed, not quite autonomous status, has been used as a method of
controlling Kurdistan’s resources and economic development. This method of control has
hindered Kurdistan’s development internationally and economically, with successive
Baghdad regimes having the ability to veto aid and trade deals arbitrarily. Furthermore,
violence has consumed neighboring Syria in a brutal civil war since 2011, which catalyzed
the rise of the Islamic State in 2014.

9

The Kurdish Gambit
The 1991 Persian Gulf War in Iraq catalyzed a new opportunity for the Kurdish
people of Iraq. They had suffered for many years under the oppression of influences
outside their culture or control, and the United States led United Nations forces victory
over Saddam Hussein meant a weakening of a longtime opponent of Kurdish political,
cultural, and economic autonomy, not just in the person of Saddam Hussein but by the
Iraqi government in Baghdad. This was the setting for the opening move towards a selfdetermined, Kurdish state.
The first move of the Kurdish pawn in the Western led foray into the Middle East
conflict would be played by United States President George H.W. Bush on March 1, 1991,
two days after Iraqi forces had been driven from Kuwait. Then President Bush stated
during a news conference from the White House, “In my own view . . . the Iraqi people
should put (Saddam) aside, and that would facilitate the resolution of all these problems
that exist and certainly would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq back into the family of
peace-loving nations."8

8

George Bush: "The President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict," March 1, 1991. Online by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19352.
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By pushing the Kurds into rebellion and opening a northern flank against the
defeated, yet still surviving government of Saddam Hussein, the coalition could increase
internal pressure against Hussein. Indeed, the main thrust of the Coalition forces had
liberated Kuwait but had stopped short of full invasion of Iraq, instead encouraging
internal Iraqi dissident populations into uprisings in the hopes of overthrowing Hussein
internally. Western propaganda focused on anti-Hussein sentiment from numerous
minority demographics. This encouragement following the quick defeat of Hussein’s
forces by UN forces, inspired a Kurdish rebellion. The Kurdish Peshmerga revolted against
the Iraqi government but were put down by superiorly armed government forces. The
weakness of Iraqi forces against the shock and awe tactics of the UN forces was obvious,
but against Peshmerga forces with no air support or armored divisions, stood little chance
of success.
Despite encouragement from the United States for this rebellion, United Nations
military forces did not come to the aid of the Kurds. Subsequently thousands of Kurds,
both members of the military as well as civilians, died. Afterwards, President Bush was
accused of bearing some culpability in their deaths. His response was contrary to the
sentiment in his previous statement from March, saying, “Do I think that the United States
should bear guilt because suggesting that the Iraqi people take matters into their hands,
with the implication that the United States would be there to support them militarily? That
was not true. We never implied that.”9 However, soon after the rebellion was put down the
UN established a no-fly zone over Kurdish Iraq, effectively ending the Iraqi government
9

Lokman I. Meho and Michel G. Nehme. “The Legacy of U.S. Support to Kurds: Two Major Episodes.” in The
Kurdish Question in U.S. Foreign Policy: A Documentary Sourcebook, ed. Lokman I. Meho (Praeger, 2004), 24
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military superiority over the Peshmerga, and would serve as a deterrent to further attacks
on Kurdish areas from the Hussein government. The limited autonomy that the Kurds had
on paper for decades was becoming factual, reified by the support of the UN military
coalition.
By 1992 the Iraqi Kurds controlled a roughly 15,000-square-mile autonomous
region in Northern Iraq with a population of three million Kurds. A National Assembly
was called and elections were held for both president and parliament and the Kurdistan
Regional Government was formed under the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, a coalition of the two
major Kurdish political parties at the time, the KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party led by
Masoud Barzani, a third generation Kurdish independence leader, whose grandfather
founded the KDP in 1946; and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan PUK, led by Jalal
Talabani, a former leader of the KDP who formed the PUK in 1975. The voting had been
slightly in favor of the KDP winning 51% of the Parliamentary Seats. The voting was also
divided along geographic lines with the KDP in the Majority in Duhok and the northern
portions of Erbil and the PUK in the majority in Slemani and southern Erbil.
This political and geographic division extended into the military with Kurdish
Peshmerga units being formed along political allegiances, equally divided between KDP
and PUK loyalty, and centered in their respective political capitals. At the heart of the issue
was Economic friction regarding the revenues from exports and power sharing within the
government, two themes that would remain part of the Kurdish paradigm for years to
come. As a semi-autonomous region of Iraq, the Kurds were beginning on the path towards
independence, but they were still a part of Iraq and subject to the UN imposed sanctions on
12

Iraq as a whole10. As the oil industry comprised the clear majority of the economy, the
banning of Iraqi oil sales by the United Nations crippled the Iraqi economy and the
Kurdish one as well. These sanctions had deep socioeconomic implications for the
populace. Food, water, and electricity shortages were exacerbated as the infrastructure
began to crumble throughout the nation. An overabundance of oil and a closed market
created a black market for oil that the KDP took advantage of, selling oil across the
Turkish border in contradiction to UN sanctions. The PUK didn’t necessarily disagree with
the sales, only that they were shut out of much of the profits as their border was with an oil
rich Iran brooked no opportunities for black market oil sales.
Despite the increasing economic crisis, the two parties managed to hold together
the KRG until 1994 when political and economic friction erupted into civil war between
KDP and PUK Peshmerga units. The civil war ended formally in 1998 with the signing of
the United States brokered Washington Agreement, an agreement that addressed revenue
and power sharing as well as a pledge to deny the use of Northern Iraqi Kurdish territory as
safe havens for Kurds in South Eastern Turkey.11 Additionally, Secretary of State
Madeline Albright had pledged in public statement and privately to the Kurdish
representatives that the United States would not permit any further military incursions by
the Iraqi government into Kurdistan.12 This and the codicil about Kurdish rebels in Turkey

10

Lokman I. Meho and Michel G. Nehme. “The Legacy of U.S. Support to Kurds: Two Major Episodes.” in The
Kurdish Question in U.S. Foreign Policy: A Documentary Sourcebook, ed. Lokman I. Meho (Praeger, 2004), 13
11
Alan Makovsky. “Policywatch 341: Kurdish Agreement Signals New U.S. Commitment.” The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy. September 29, 1998. accessed August 20, 2016.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/kurdish-agreement-signals-new-u.s.commitment.
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speak to a long term outlook for Iraqi Kurdistan, as they address international relations
between the Kurds and sovereign nations without the interlocution of Baghdad.
However, the economic issues that caused the civil conflict were being addressed
even prior to the signing of the Washington Agreement. UN Security Council Resolutions
986 implemented the Oil for Food program that was designed to allow Iraq to sell some of
its oil in return for food and humanitarian aid. This aid was welcome as the sanctions had
been in place since 1991 and despite efforts by the international community to arrange for
limited oil exports as early as 1991, the Iraqi regime rejected assistance in defiance of the
international sanctions on their sovereignty. In April of 1995 the UN voted to implement
Resolution 986, which was finally accepted by the Iraqi government in May of 1996. Oil
sales began in December of that year, and food shipments reached Iraq in March of the
following year.13 This helped to stabilize the economic conditions of Kurdistan, but it
functioned as a stabilizer only. The official humanitarian point of entry into Kurdistan lay
in KDP controlled Duhok, along the border with Turkey at Zakho14, this gave the KDP an
advantage in aid access which helped to foster a continuing internal friction between the
two major parties. As the oil and food began to flow in earnest, a dependency culture
landscape formed in Kurdistan. Kurdistan’s primary economic base, aside from oil, is
agriculture. Kurdistan is in the bread basket of the Fertile Crescent; agriculture could have

13

“Statement to the Security Council by the Secretary-General on the closure of the Oil-for-Food
Programme – 20 November 2003.” United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme Oil-for-Food. un.org
November 20, 2003. accessed August 20, 2016.
http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/latest/sgstatement031119.html.
14
Sarah Graham Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq, (London: I.B. Taurus,
1999), 27
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served as an efficient economic catalyst for the rebuilding of Kurdistan. However, as noted
by Kerim Yildez, “Centralised purchasing of food and medicine and the importing of
foodstuffs from outside of Iraq removed the incentive for farmers to plant crops, enervating
the local agricultural economy.”15 This was an extension of the conflict between the Kurds
and the Hussein regime. While the Saddam could not reign in the Kurds militarily, he
could through bureaucratic methods hinder the development of an economic infrastructure
that would foster sustainable long term growth. As Yildez notes, “The UN’s expressed
reason for not buying local crops was that it would upset the Baghdad regime.”16 The UN
agencies were aware of the issue but the immediate needs and the greater good of the
entirety of the Iraqi population created a Kafkaesque surrealism, where a “Desire to avoid
confrontation with Baghdad meant that UN agencies did not officially ‘recognise’ the
ministries of the KRG, despite the paradox of their close collaboration and the KRG’s need
to sign off on joint projects.”17
Semi- autonomy had not severed ties with the still constituted Hussein regime, who
recognized that an economically strong united Kurdistan would pose a threat to
maintaining the integrity of Iraq as a unified nation. Interference from the Baghdad
highlighted and continued divide between the Kurds and the government of Iraq even amid
crisis and speaks to the irreconcilable differences that exist between the two. The
assurances from the US government to protect Kurdish territory and the humanitarian aid
that flowed into Kurdistan despite the political and bureaucratic roadblocks gave way to a
15

Kerim Yildiz and Project Kurdish Human Rights, The Kurds In Iraq : The Past, Present And Future. (London:
Pluto Press, 2007), 74
16
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growing Kurdish state. Kurdistan’s semi-autonomous status was a slight boon in the
context of the OFFP’s distribution of aid; at 13% of Iraq’s population, 13% of the total
revenue was earmarked for Kurdistan, from the remaining 87% war reparations, UN
operating costs were deducted, giving a per capita distribution edge to Kurdistan18.
Additionally, during this period, international NGOs provided aid to Kurdistan, however
they did so without government approval and were forced to flee for a time in 1996 when
the government of Iraq invaded Slemani during the Kurdish Civil War. These NGOs
sought to implement literacy programs and community building organizations to give
Kurdish communities the framework for sustainable development and rebuilding, which
were notably absent from the OFFP.19

18

Quil Lawrence. “A Shaky Defacto Kurdistan.” The Middle East Report Iraq: A Decade of Devastation 215,
vol. 30, article 8, (2000). accessed August 17, 2016. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer215.
19
Ibid

16

A Post Saddam Iraq

Overall the Oil for Food Program was perceived as successful as noted by then
Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Anon in his Statement to the Security
Council on November 20, 2003, “In nearly seven years of operation, the Oil-for-Food
Programme has been required to meet an almost impossible series of challenges, using
some 46 billion dollars of Iraqi export earnings on behalf of the Iraqi people…meeting the
needs of the civilian population across some 24 economic and social sectors.”20 This
statement was made as the Oil for Food Program was closing, no longer needed as the
overthrow of the Hussein regime was accomplished via the United States invasion earlier
that year. The Kurds for their part took the opportunity to assist the United States and
attacked government forces as well, lending legitimacy to the United States invasion as
well as future claims to Kurdish sovereignty. With the assistance of US Special forces, the
Peshmerga seized the Iraqi cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. Both cities are in areas with
Kurdish majority populations but not included in the three official governates.
Kurdish control of Kirkuk, the center of northern Iraq’s oil industry, prompted
Turkish alarm, as control of Kirkuk by a semi-autonomous Kurdistan would create a

20
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stronger argument for a sovereign Kurdistan. The city of Kirkuk sits next to a supergiant
oil field, with an estimated five billion barrels of oil in reserve, and a substantial oil
infrastructure. Control of Kirkuk and the surrounding region has long been contested by
the Kurds and the Iraqi regime. Importantly, Kirkuk allows direct Kurdish access to a
pipeline outside of Turkish control through Southwestern Iraq and into Jordan and beyond.
Turkey’s concern was twofold, a Kurdish Kirkuk would give Kurdistan an enormous
economic base in oil reserves, with direct access to two major pipelines. Turkey had long
enjoyed the fruits of the regular and black market oil trade with Kurdistan because of the
proximity of Kurdish fields to the north south pipeline. Turkey, a sovereign nation in
alliance with the United States via NATO as well as allowing the US access to air space
and refueling for the campaign registered complaint with the US who then assured Turkey
of a US controlled Kirkuk, not a Kurdish one. A strengthen Kurdistan Region in Iraq
would further embolden Turkish Kurds and their violent struggle for autonomy in Turkey.
Despite the Peshmerga fighters being forced to retreat, the victory and subsequent
US control led to a return of many Kurdish families to Kirkuk. These families had been
forced out by programs of Arabization by Iraqi government in the 1990ss the Kurds went
from nearly 50% of the population of Kirkuk to 21%21. However, in the elections that
followed, a Kurdish candidate. Abdul Rahman Mustafa, won the mayor-governorship of
Kirkuk. While he ruled under the Iraqi government, not the Kurdish one, his election and
party alliance with the PUK, and Kurdistan speaks to Kurdish claims for control of Kirkuk.
21

Liam D. Anderson and Gareth Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise.
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 43
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A planned referendum on Kirkuk’s inclusion into Kurdistan was delayed initially
for six months and became mired in the political struggles of the United States led
Coalition Authority, as well as the outside influence of Iraq’s neighbors. The initial
agreement sought to “…to take measures to remedy the injustice caused by the previous
regime’s practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including
Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing
migration in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the
inhabitants of work, and correcting nationality.”22 It included requirements on the
government to make reparations to for lost properties of such persons, as well as promote
economic opportunity and growth. Once these measures were implemented the agreement
would then “The permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, shall be
deferred until after these measures are completed, a fair and transparent census has been
conducted and the permanent constitution has been ratified. This resolution shall be
consistent with the principle of justice, taking into account the will of the people of those
territories.”23 This Article was affirmed by Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution on 2005,
calling for a completed resolution to the status of Kirkuk by the end of 2007. This was
further delayed and the recommendation of the UNAMI, United Nations Assistance
Mission for Iraq to divide the Kirkuk governates was rejected. In 2009, Najat Hasan
Karim, a top official in the KDP in Kirkuk was quoted as saying, "We shall accept a
solution for Kirkuk worked out by the parties inside the city and oppose any solution

22
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imported from outside parties that are enemies to the Kurdish people's experiment.”24 This
highlights the strong desire for self-determination among Kurdish people outside of Iraqi
Kurdistan, also what concerns the government not only of Iraq, but of Turkey and Iran as
well. Referendums can set precedents, and successful referendum for one part of Kurdish
lands would catalyze a desire for independence for all.
While Kurdistan and its allies in the Kirkuk region maneuvered for control and
eventual integration, as if a sovereign state, Kurdistan itself was still unrecognized which
detracted from the legitimacy of their negotiations. Due to their unsure international status,
they were forced to operate in a state of limbo, “…Nina Caspersen notes that
‘unrecognized states exist in the shadows of international relations, in a kind of limbo, and
the renewed outbreak of war is an ever-present risk and defining feature of their
existence’—words that ring very true for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in this period.”25
This threat of war helped define their economic development as well; their alliance with
the United States required them to be strong and cohesive militarily as well as politically to
serve as leverage against the emerging Iraqi Sunni and Shia parties and militias in southern
Iraq, as well as against Iran, Turkey, and Syria,
In contrast to the turbulence in Iraqi governance following the 2003 regime change,
the KDR during this period had a stable regional government and a growing economy; the
market price of oil began to rise dramatically in 2003, adding revenue to the coffers of the
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KDR and enhancing their stability and fueling economic development. In 2005 elections, a
non-binding referendum on independence was held alongside regional elections, and
98.8% of the three governates of the KDR chose independence. While this was in no way
binding, it indicates an overwhelming nationalist sentiment. While US coalition
government tried to establish a working government in southern Iraq, Kurdistan’s
economy began to thrive riding rising oil prices. However, this was necessary, as oil was
the obvious vehicle for the rapid generation of revenue. As Gareth Stansfield points out,
“The Kurds realized even before regime change in Baghdad that for the Kurdistan Region
to be truly autonomous within Iraq, they would need to have a mechanism whereby
revenue would at least be transferred to them from the centre, or at best allow them to
generate the revenue themselves.” That is, they needed a sure source of revenue to
maintain the status quo of semi autonomy. Stansfield continues, “This mechanism was to
be found in the relationship between the federal structure of Iraq and the management of
the oil and gas sector.”26 Essentially the mechanism would develop along the lines of
Kurdistan contributing a designated amount of production to the overall output of the Iraqi
oil and natural gas exports and would receive an agreed upon amount of remuneration.
However, this reliance on oil sales created a rentier state and a new set of challenges and
opportunities for Kurdish development. A rentier state is one that derives the bulk of its
revenues from the rent of natural resources to external sources27. In Kurdistan’s case, like

26

Gareth Stansfield “The Unravelling of the post-First World War state system? The Kurdistan Region of Iraq
and the transformation of the Middle East.” International Affairs 89 vol. 2, 2013, (Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
Oxford UK), 272
27
Hossein Mahdavy, "The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of
Iran", in Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. M.A. Cook (Oxford University Press, Oxford
1970), 429

21

many Middle Eastern countries, the natural resource is oil. When a state is deriving its
revenues in this matter, it is not reliant on taxation to support the government, in fact
citizens of rentier states share in the profits, at the least by way of little or no taxation, and
in some cases by way of cash payments. The downside of the rentier state is not only the
obvious economic correlation between oil market prices and the ability of the state to
support itself via potentially unstable revenue. As Hossein Muhdavy writes in the Patterns
and Problems in Rentier States, “the oil revenues received by the governments of the oil
exporting countries have very little to do with the production processes of their domestic
economies. The inputs from the local economies – other than he raw materials – are
insignificant.”28 That last sentence is crucial, this paradigm not only minimizes economic
development outside of the main rent context, that is the oil industry; it involves only the
extraction of a raw material limiting the technology and workforce to a specific area.
Politically, the state is not reliant on the citizens for support, its interests lie with the
external customers who purchase the oil, and the corporations who extract the oil. This is
not a fatal economic condition, however the state must be proactive with rent revenues,
investing them into areas outside the rent industry, such as education, agriculture,
communications infrastructure as well as national and local transportation infrastructures.
These will serve to strengthen the economy and catalyze sustainable development.
In Kurdistan, several issues would be roadblocks to sustainable development across
a broad spectrum of the economy. Per World Bank data, government employee

28

Hossein Mahdavy, "The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of
Iran", in Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. M.A. Cook (Oxford University Press, Oxford
1970), 428

22

compensation was 36.6% of the budget by 2013, rivaling the 37.5% budgeted for projects
and reconstruction29. Their political position requires them to maintain a strong military
which requires a significant portion of revenue as the ever-present possibility of war is a
defining part of their existence. They must be strong to survive. Furthermore, massive
government revenues led to a large increase in government jobs, this was exacerbated by
the still internally divided Kurdish government. Despite showing a unified front, internal
rivalries catalyzed reward jobs, given as rewards to citizens for political support. This issue
of political corruption has created backlash in Kurdistan, leading to the creation of the
Movement for Change, or the Gorran Party, which is gaining political momentum in the
Kurdish Parliament with each election.
The private sector also grew in Kurdistan in the post Saddam Iraq. Per joint World
Bank and KRG data, the number of private companies registered with the KRG rose from
“7,440 in 2008 to 13,216 in 2011 and to 20,994 in July 2014.”30 This shows a near tripling
of private sector companies in six years. Furthermore, World bank date indicates that “of
20,994 registered firms, only 2,822 are foreign firms.”31 This is an 86.6% majority for
local private economic concerns. Internally this growth has been concentrated in the Erbil
governates, where 63 percent of local companies are based as well as 74 percent of foreign
companies.32 KRG-licensed investment projects between November 2006 and September
2014 were estimated to be $41.2 billion; local investment comprising of 77% and foreign
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direct investment and joint ventures at 23%. We can see in the chart to the left that
reflective of the concentration of companies in Erbil, a large portion of the investment has
gone to the Erbil governates. 33 This investment has been distributed to industry and
housing predominantly. The domination of housing development is further highlighted by
the fact that housing projects were frozen by the KRG in 2012 amid concerns about a clear
strategy in the sector and increasing housing speculation. The heavy investments in
tourism represent the stability of Kurdistan during this time, a period of conflict for the rest
of Iraq as well as the middle East in general. What the graph also show however is low
investment in areas that would precursor sustainable growth, health, education, agriculture,
and communications. Without these, Kurdistan would be susceptible to market changes
that would directly affect the rent revenues that were sustaining the economy. That is not to
say that such development endeavors are ignored, nor are they local and international
nonprofit agencies play have played a continuing role in the development of Kurdistan.
Their efforts are overshadowed on the world stage by the continuing conflict over power
and oil that dominates the region, which simultaneously is the catalyst for the international
support.
However, oil prices remained high and Kurdistan’s growing reputation as a
lucrative investment location began to pay off. The government helped facilitate
investment with the Investment Law of 2006, which offers tax and customs exemptions for
10 years starting from the date of providing services by the project or the date of actual
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production. However, Kurdistan performs more poorly than Iraq on the labor market,
financing conditions, and infrastructure.34
Kurdistan’s oil and gas strategy came to fruition in 2011, just as American troops
were preparing to withdraw from Iraq and leave a newly formed Iraqi government in place.
In October of that year Exxon Mobil, signed production sharing agreements with the
Kurdistan Region, which included production from Kirkuk and other disputed areas of
control. This was significant not only in the potential revenues but it showed the increasing
stature of Kurdistan in the international community and would lend legitimacy to
Kurdistan’s territorial claims as well as independence. Exxon Mobile’s confidence was
contagious; by July of the following year, Chevron signed contracts, followed by French
oil company Total at the end of July and Russian energy company Gazprom Neft in
August.35 While the companies themselves do not hold political power per se, their
countries of origin, the United States, France, and Russia are significant power brokers on
the international scene and broadened the scope of Kurdistan’s political development. Due
to this increased foreign investment and inventible political entwinement, as Stansfield
puts it, “the future of the Kurdistan Region will begin to rise up the agendas of foreign
services across the world… The question of oil exports from the region, sitting as it does
on significant and impressive reserves, and exercising de facto if not de jure sovereignty
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over its territory, will now begin to take on a new dynamism.”36 This vigor would hold out
in the face of new conflicts and old, but not in the face of a depressed oil market.
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2011- New Conflict, New Opportunity
Kurdistan’s new contracts with international oil companies and the far-reaching
possibilities they represented did not go unnoticed in Baghdad. The end of 2011 saw the
withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and the full acquisition of power by the newly minted
Iraqi Parliament. Southern Iraq had been plagued by Sunni – Shia violence and this
violence would soon grow into civil war in the power vacuum that occurred upon US
withdrawal, as well as the rise of an organized and armed Islamic State, bent on reestablishing a Sunni Caliphate. Immediately however, problems with the mechanism for
the export of Kurdistan’s oil and gas came to the forefront. The Iraqi government chose not
to facilitate payments for exports to the IOCs, and by the end of 2012, these exports were
negligible.37 This obviously inhibited Kurdish economic plans, but also was an implicit
statement regarding Kurdish political status from Baghdad, that they were the arbiters of
Iraq, and Kurdistan was part of Iraq. This reaffirmation of power through economic means
forced Kurdistan to focus on establishing a mechanism of sales that was independent of
Baghdad. This issue would be a thorn in the side of Kurdistan’s long term economic
independence and sovereign aspirations.
As with the OFFP in previous years, Baghdad held the strings by which
Kurdistan’s oil revenues would be processed and paid. Baghdad facilitated Kurdish sales
and payments on exports through Baghdad, as part of the overall output of the Iraqi
economy, but recognized that economic independence would help solidify political
independence, a less than desirable outcome for the Baghdad government. Turkey saw
37
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opportunity to expand its power in this situation. A long term and often violent relationship
exists between Turkey and the Kurdish people, but Turkey’s lack of its own oil reserves
and geographic positioning to supply gas to Europe would dovetail with KRG plans to
increase oil outputs to 1 million barrels per day by 201538. The KRG also set ambitious
goals for this period; including reducing the unemployment rate from 17 to 4 per cent,
creating 100,000 jobs a year and achieving an average annual GDP growth rate of 8 per
cent, that would include agricultural sector expansion of 15 per cent, manufacturing by 5
per cent and tourism by 7 per cent.39 By mid-2012, As Baghdad’s strategy became
apparent, the KRG began to export oil to Turkey, first via tanker truck, and by 2013 via a
pipeline. A proposed Turkish pipeline to supply Europe with natural gas, Nabbucco, would
create an instant market for Kurdish natural gas, but it has been held up by international
concerns voiced by Russia and Iran, concerning Iran’s participation in the pipeline as a
source of the natural gas. Again Kurdistan is a useful pawn to the western interests, this
time providing the threat of an alternative to economically suppress a non-Western
political rival.
In contrast to the rest of Iraq, Kurdistan remained stable and growing posting 12%
increase in GDP in 2012. Perhaps because of this stability, it was here, beginning as early
as March 2011, that the civil war in neighboring Syria began to spill over into Iraq as
refugees fleeing the growing conflict in Syria fled their country to Kurdistan. As
Kurdistan’s economy continued to grow, it absorbed the initial refugee population with
38
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assistance from the UNHCR and associated agencies. The flow would continue unabated,
increasing daily as the war in Syria continued.
As previously indicated, the economy of Kurdistan continued to grow, posting
double digit gains until the price of oil began to fall from over $100/barrel to below $60 in
June of 2014. This was a significant blow to oil revenues worldwide, and prices continued
to drop hitting a low of $35 a barrel in December of 2015. In Kurdistan, the KRGs oil
selling mechanism with the central government again became a point of economic and
political contention. Kurdistan’s portion of the federal budget was tied to contribution to
national oil sales through the central government, and the government began to withhold
payments to the KRG with accusations of not meeting production agreements and selling
the oil meant for these quotas to Turkey via their direct pipeline. The KRG denied these
accusations and a stalemate ensued. Considering the KRG’s large public sector, this lack of
revenue led to unpaid government employees, from teachers, to bureaucrats, and the
Peshmerga military as well. That these employees, especially the Peshmerga who put their
lives on the line, would continue to perform their jobs without pay speaks to a belief in
Kurdistan that goes beyond immediate needs or rewards. This issue remained stalemated
until a 2015 United States brokered agreement between the two factions was thought to
have resolved it. However, this agreement fell through with accusations of underpayments
from the central government to Kurdistan and renewed objections to Kurdistan’s
independent oil sales. This interruption in payments from SOMO (XXX), represented a
decrease in revenues from $12 billion to $1 billion.
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The Shia led majority government in Baghdad faced a growing Sunni insurgency
that was fueled by the neighboring Syrian civil war and violent divisions between the two
primary Islamic sects. The Syrian war features a similar dichotomy between an Iranian
Shia supported Assad regime and an opposition that was becoming increasingly dominated
by a Salafist Sunni element, radical in its religious beliefs and political aims. This group
became the known as the Islamic State, tracing their leader’s heritage to the bloodline of
the Prophet Mohammed, and laying claim to a renewed Caliphate in January of 2014. As
the Islamic State began to make territorial gains in Iraq and Syria, US trained Iraqi troops
ran from IS engagements leaving war materiel in the field for the Islamic State to claim
and become increasingly strengthened. Kurdish Peshmerga forces, seasoned by years of
war footing and emboldened by the KRG’s rising strength, as well as United States Special
Forces, entered combat again, knowing their own survival and hopes for sovereignty were
again tied to violence.
The rising violence and the merging of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq increased the
flow of refugees to Kurdistan as well as an increasing number of IDPs from parts of Iraq
controlled by the Islamic State. By May of 2014, 223,113 Syrian refugees were registered
or awaiting registration by the UNHCR in the Kurdistan Region, which amount to 97% of
the Syrian refugees in Iraq.40 Joint World Bank and KRG cost estimates for the
stabilization of these displaced people in Kurdistan was $1.4 billion in 2015.41 By May of
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2016, the number of IDPs from southern Iraq and Syrian refugees combined reached 1.8
million, a 28% increase in Kurdistan’s population. While the KRG is managing the influx
with due diligence, an increase in population of that magnitude is a burden to the already
empty coffers.
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Conclusion
The intersection of development and self-determination in Kurdistan brings new
opportunity to study this intersection and how economic and political empowerment of
marginalized people must go hand in hand to be sustainable. In Iraq, Kurds were oppressed
for decades under oppressive Baghdad regimes that actively and tacitly suppressed their
culture and therefore their right to self-determination as individuals and as a demographic
group. This is directly tied to the division of Ottoman territories by Western actors. The
modern nation of Iraq is comprised of groups that have become enmeshed in a nation that
was socially constructed with little regard to the inhabitants. The Kurdish people were
particularly affected by this as their culture was divided between four nations, forming a
minority that resisted assimilation into the social constructs, and strove to have agency in
their development. Instead they were marginalized, oppressed, and denied their right to
self-determination. The marginalization of the Kurds served to galvanize Kurdish dreams
of their own nation, and when opportunity presented itself, to exercise their right to selfdetermination and development in the pursuit of that dream.
Development actors that have operated in Kurdistan have been prevented from
providing aid that was not approved by the national government, even the UN
acknowledged the primacy of the national government in Baghdad over the Kurdish
government in Erbil during the Oil for Food Program, which allowed the export of natural
resources from Kurdistan in return for food aid. These resources were firmly in Kurdish
hands, yet their sale was ultimately arbitrated by the national government, not the Kurdish
government. This is a repeating and increasingly prohibitive condition that has been used
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to economically suppress growth in Kurdistan, who physically control and are maintaining
and improving the infrastructure to harvest and export the vast oil and natural gas resources
located in Kurdistan. By denying Kurdistan the revenues from these resources, they are
denying Kurdistan the ability to provide for its citizens. This is a violation of the social
contract that the government in Baghdad holds with the people of Kurdistan, lending
credence for their desire for independence.
This control mechanism of the means of Kurdish self-governance in the hands of an
Iraqi government that has yet to prove its ability to govern southern Iraq is questionable
when looking at the stability of Kurdistan after an initial period of civil conflict. Since then
Kurdistan has been a growing and vibrant parliamentary democracy, with the two parties
that dominated the political landscape losing their duopoly, creating a climate of
empowerment and political competition for votes, thereby encouraging their voices to be
heard. In contrast the Baghdad government has been violently divided along religious lines
and unable to maintain control in the face of insurgency and immersion in external
conflict.
Conflict was at the foundation of Kurdistan, by serving Western interests in the
Gulf Wars the Kurds established autonomy for themselves. This is notable, as it was
Western interests that created the boundaries that divided the Kurdish people and denied
their right to self-determination. While conflict may have catalyzed their development, and
continues to provide opportunity for cooperation with Western nations and lend credibility
to increasing Kurdish sovereignty it is a drain on economic resources that could be
redirected to development projects. As the conflict with IS in Iraq winds down and peace is
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restored in Iraq, the reconfiguring of the economy from war footing to economic growth is
essential. Kurdistan has proven that given opportunity to control their own resources and
direct their own development, they are more than capable of successful development.
This success has almost guaranteed a demand for an answer to the question of
Kurdish sovereignty in Iraq. The non-binding referendum in 2014 was overwhelmingly in
favor of independence, and a new referendum was planned for 2016, but was postponed
due to the ongoing conflict against the Islamic State. This postponement will not last. In
early 2017, the Islamic State is being driven from Mosul, their last major stronghold in
Iraq. The liberation of Mosul and the defeat of the Islamic State will without a doubt create
a demand from the citizens of Kurdistan for a referendum to determine their future.
Unfortunately, though they are the primary stakeholder, the arbitration of Kurdish
sovereignty does not lay in democracy alone. Ideally from the Kurdish, their political
development of a democratic state, and their proven economic record would create the
international backing to allow for full independence but that remains to be seen.
Additionally, the Kurdish state that has congealed in northern Iraq has less than a quarter
of the world’s Kurdish population, what would an independent Kurdish state in Iraq mean
to them?
Lastly, in the two historical examples mentioned in the introduction, Turkey and
Israel, neither was the result of a referendum or economic success. Both nations were born
in through a violent expression of self-determination, and created oppression and
marginalization in the areas that they claimed. Turkey’s genocide of the Armenian people
during the rush to maintain national borders is well documented, and the conflict between
34

Israelis and Palestinians continues to the present day. This cycle of violence can be
avoided in Kurdistan. The right to self-determination has long been denied to the Kurds,
and yet they have persevered and flourished, adapting to changes while maintaining their
own identity. Their inclusion in socially constructed nations was forced on them, their
continuing growth and prosperity speaks to the proven ability to govern themselves though
the establishment of a social contract with a government that they have chosen, whose
policies and interests will benefit Kurds.
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